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Religious Fictionalism1 
By Michael Scott and Finlay Malcolm 
 
[forthcoming in Philosophy Compass] 
 
 
Abstract: Religious fictionalism is the theory that it is morally and intellectually legitimate to 
affirm religious sentences, and to engage in public and private religious practices, without 
believing the content of religious claims. This article discusses the main features of fictionalism, 
contrasts hermeneutic and revolutionary kinds of fictionalism, and explores possible historical 
and recent examples of religious fictionalism. Such examples are found in recent theories of 
faith, pragmatic approaches to religion, and mystical traditions in religious theology. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Religious fictionalism is the theory that it is morally and intellectually legitimate to affirm 
religious sentences without believing the content of what is said.2 Additionally, religious 
fictionalists propose that it is similarly legitimate to engage in public and private religious 
practices, such as the observation of religious festivals, going to church, or prayer, without 
having religious beliefs. In general, fictionalists take the benefits of religious engagement to be 
available to those who do not believe that the claims of religion are true, or even to those that 
believe these claims are in error. Beyond these points, however, there are significant theoretical 
differences in the ways in which religious fictionalism has been developed. In what follows, we 
will look to explain the theory, consider examples of religious fictionalism, and contrast it with 
other theories of religious discourse to show how fictionalism is distinctive. We will also find 
that some theories of religious discourse, even though they are not presented in this guise, 
plausibly qualify as fictionalist. 
 
2. PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS 
Fictionalism has been defended for a number of different domains of philosophical interest, 
including ethics, mathematics, modality and science.  A precursor to the lively modern debate 
about fictionalism is Vaihinger (1924); as we will see, however, there are candidates for 
religious fictionalism that can be found in much earlier writings. 
A widely used distinction across all the domains in which fictionalism is defended is 
between hermeneutic and revolutionary types of fictionalism. Hermeneutic fictionalists purport 
to describe current practice: speakers, when they engage in the target discourse, are not 
committed to the existence of the things that the discourse describes. Hermeneutic fictionalism 
about God-talk proposes, for instance, that the utterance 
(1) God created the universe 
                                                 
1 This is an uncorrected pre-print version. When citing please use the final journal version. 
2 We take a religious sentence to be one that posits or describes a religious property, agent or state of 
affairs; particular attention is usually given to sentences about God. 
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may be sincerely affirmed without the speaker believing that God created the universe. 
Revolutionary fictionalists, in contrast, propose a revision to current practice. The commitments 
that speakers currently may have to the truth of the claims of the target discourse are misplaced 
and should be jettisoned. Speakers should, however, continue to engage with the discourse 
without believing it. To be a revolutionary fictionalist about talk concerning Fs, therefore, is to 
take the view that sentences about Fs should not be believed (either because we should be 
agnostic about them or, more boldly, because they are false) and also the view that talk about Fs 
should not be eliminated. In the case of religion, revolutionary fictionalism occupies a 
particularly interesting theoretical position: its supporters treat reasons for not believing as 
insufficient to show that one should not continue to engage in religious discourse and practice.3  
If the sentences of the discourse should not be believed what attitude should be taken? A 
widely proposed answer is non-doxastic acceptance. To accept p is to go along with p, and to 
take p as a premise in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning (see Cohen 1992, 4). For 
instance, according to van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism,4 when a scientist says 
(2) Quarks exist 
she should accept rather than believe that quarks exist. Why accept claims that we should not 
believe? Fictionalists typically point to their pragmatic benefits. For example, accepting that 
there are theoretical entities such as quarks facilitates useful predictions. Theories may be 
accepted because they are ‘empirically adequate’, as van Fraassen argues, without theorisers 
believing that they are true. In general, revolutionary fictionalists need to make a case for the 
pragmatic advantages of accepting claims that should not be believed. We will turn to the 
religious corollary of this in Section 3. Hermeneutic fictionalism, in contrast, needs to show that 
the claims of the disputed discourse are – as a matter of current linguistic practice – accepted 
rather than believed; their usefulness, therefore, is a separate issue.5  
 Revolutionary fictionalists propose that one may engage in religious discourse without 
believing that what one says is true, so they need to explain why this is not endorsing outright 
deceit. Since asserting a sentence appears conventionally to express belief in its truth,6 then 
affirming (1) – speaking as a fictionalist – better not be asserting what it appears to say. Two 
main solutions have been proposed. One option, influenced by David Lewis’ treatment of fiction 
(1978), is that utterances of the disputed discourse should be understood as containing a silent 
operator whereby they are true in the fiction that… or according to the theory that…. For 
example, on one fictionalist treatment of modality, saying ‘possibly p’ should be interpreted as 
                                                 
3 The hermeneutic/revolutionary terminology comes from Burgess (1983). A third arm to the fictionalist 
taxonomy – ‘evaluative fictionalism’ – has been recently proposed by Jay (2014, 211-212), in which 
fictionalist engagement in the domain is seen as a pro tanto good, but not sufficient to recommend 
engagement all things considered. A fourth variety is ‘hypothetical fictionalism’ proposed by Sauchelli 
(forthcoming), which is a contextualist account, advising a fictionalist stance towards propositions from a 
domain only in certain contexts, but not in others. 
4 Although van Fraassen did not describe this theory as fictionalist it can be seen as a fictionalist account 
of scientific discourse about theoretical entities. For an overview see Liggins (2012). 
5 Separate but related: hermeneutic fictionalists need an account of what norms inform the acceptance or 
rejection of sentences of the discourse if speakers do not believe them and pragmatic considerations may 
come into play to address this issue. 
6 See Scott (2016) for discussion and qualifications. 
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‘according to the theory of possible worlds, p is true in some possible world’.7 Similarly, for 
religious fictionalism, (1) might be interpreted as a façon de parler for (something like) 
(1*) According to the Christian fiction, God created the world. 
Robin LePoidevin is sympathetic to this approach, proposing the following construction: ‘any 
given theological statement p is true if and only if it is true in the theological fiction that p’ 
(2016, 178). However, difficulties with the silent operator theory that have been raised in the 
literature on ethical fictionalism look similarly challenging for the case of religion (see Joyce 
2005). For example, (1) along with  
 
(3) 23% of the universe is made of dark matter. 
(4) God created a universe that is made of 23% dark matter. 
 
appears to be a valid argument. However, if (1) and (4) are interpreted in line with the silent 
operator theory the argument is invalid. Moreover, unless the theological fictions is extended to 
include claims about dark matter, the interpretation appears to render (4) false. A second option 
is to say that fictionalists quasi-assert rather than assert the sentences of the discourse: quasi-
assertion is a speech act that behaves similarly to assertion but does not commit the speaker to 
the truth of what is said. One contender for quasi-assertion – we will consider others presently – 
is pretend assertion. So, when the religious fictionalist says that ‘God exists’, she does not 
express the belief that God exists, because she only pretends to assert that God exists. Peter 
Lipton (2007) appears more sympathetic to this way of developing religious fictionalism.  
Fictionalism is distinct from other ‘anti-realist’ accounts of religious language (for a 
detailed review of the field see Scott 2013 and 2017). To the extent that religious realists treat 
religious discourse at face-value, they agree on certain key points with fictionalists. For 
instance, both reject reductionist approaches that give non-religious (often naturalistic) truth-
conditions for religious sentences.8 Religious sentences, fictionalists agree, should be treated at 
face-value as having their apparent subject matter. Fictionalists eschew the reinterpretation or 
substantial revision to the central claims of the religious tradition at issue.9 Similarly, 
fictionalists reject non-cognitivist theories of religious language that propose that sentences like 
(1) do not represent a religious subject matter but instead expresses the speaker’s awe, wonder, 
or perhaps some emotion towards God.10 Where fictionalist and realist disagree is on the use of 
religious sentences and specifically the attitude that speakers have or should have towards them: 
                                                 
7 For more detailed accounts see Rosen (1990) and Divers (1999). 
8 Take, for example, Spinoza’s claim that ‘By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of 
Nature, or chain of natural events’ (2002, 417). 
9 For this reason proposals by theologians – notably Feuerbach, Strauss and Kafuman (1981) among 
many others – to eliminate supernatural commitments by reinterpreting the meanings of religious 
sentences or by revising doctrine should be seen as part of a distinct tradition from religious fictionalism. 
10 Braithwaite (1955) is an interesting case here. His interpretation of many religious utterances such as 
(1) as ‘declarations of commitments to a way of life’ (1955, 15) appears to be straightforwardly non-
cognitivist. However, he also allows for descriptive religious discourse – talk about religious figures, 
parables, accounts of the creation, etc. – that he says are ‘stories’ that should not be believed but that 
provide instructive models of good behaviour. His treatment of this latter region of religious discourse 
looks more in line with fictionalism. 
4 
 
realists take speakers to assert and believe the (indicative) religious sentences that they utter, 
whereas fictionalists take them to quasi-assert and accept those sentences. 
We will look at some reasons in favour of revolutionary fictionalism. We then consider 
some worked out examples of the theory, before looking at a close relation to revolutionary 
fictionalism sometimes called ‘conservationism’. We then address several cases of hermeneutic 
fictionalism. 
 
3. THE UTILITY OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 
Evidently, one component of the thesis of religious fictionalists (that they share with atheists 
and agnostics) is that the claims of religious discourse should not be believed. This is, of course, 
a substantial and contentious issue in its own right but not one that we will pursue in this paper. 
Let us suppose that there are reasons for either not believing or disbelieving that any of the 
things posited in religious discourse – God, miracles, angels, grace, spirits, etc. – exist. What is 
distinctive about religious fictionalism is the contention that considerations about the pragmatic 
merits of engaging in religion should trump concerns about the truth of religion. Specifically, 
these considerations are sufficiently compelling that we should prefer the continued engagement 
with religious discourse rather than its elimination.11  
 One promising place to start is with the role of religious discourse and practice in 
supporting ethical standards. Religious texts provide ethical guidance in the form of stories of 
good practice and of reward and punishment that can help direct one’s thoughts and practical 
decision making and strengthen one’s resolve against weakness of the will (for a comparable 
argument about ethical fictionalism, see Joyce 2002). Religious stories, particularly when bound 
together as incidents in the life of a religious figure, can provide models of good behaviour that 
are more memorable and engaging to the imagination and stimulating to one’s actions than bare 
moral principles. As Ronald Hepburn puts it, ‘the Old and New Testaments as a whole (and 
other religious documents) provide a single extended ‘story’ or ‘myth’ or set of symbols, 
depicting a pattern of life and giving the same sort of aids to keen self-knowledge, and stimulus 
to moral effort, as the parable proper gives. The moral pattern of life is the fundamental thing: 
the story its vehicle.’ (1959, 191-92)12 
 J. S. Mill’s Three Essays on Religion is also notable here. Although Mill is critical of 
some supposed positive moral effects of religion, he concedes that the standard of excellence 
and models for imitation provided by a perfect being and by religious figures, ‘give an increase 
of force’ and stimulation of ‘aspirations towards goodness’ that go ‘beyond what they can 
receive from reference to a merely ideal conception.’ (2009, 213) He concludes, ‘the influences 
of religion on the character which will remain after rational criticism has done its utmost against 
the evidences of religion, are well worth preserving’ (215). Mill also proposes that religious 
ideas can have beneficial effects on our imaginations and hopes: ‘the indulgence of hope with 
regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we recognize 
as a clear truth that we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and philosophically 
                                                 
11 The revolutionary fictionalist case is usually presented defensively as justification for a current 
disbeliever or non-believer to remain engaged in religious discourse and practice, rather than showing 
that current disbelievers or non-believers ought to engage in religion.  
12 Hepburn’s combination of disbelief in central Christian doctrines combined with the case he makes for 
their practical value makes him a plausible candidate as a religious fictionalist. 
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defensible.’ (211) For instance, hope for an afterlife can cultivate the improvement of character 
until the end of one’s life. 
 Some recent authors defend fictionalist engagement in religion as a guide to moral and 
practical decision making. Peter Lipton suggests that one ‘immerse’ oneself in the religion by 
‘entering the form of religious practice and religious thought…[which involves] participation 
and a kind of commitment to action’ (2007, 43). Robin LePoidevin proposes that engagement 
with certain religious practices like worship and prayer may refine our emotional responses to 
others and attitudes towards ourselves: ‘in so doing we allow ourselves to become emotionally 
involved, to the extent that a religious service is capable of being an intense experience…What 
remains, when the game of make-believe is over, is an awareness of our responsibilities for 
ourselves and others, of the need to pursue spiritual goals, and so on’ (Le Poidevin 1996, 119). 
Andrew Eshleman claims that ‘inhabiting the time-tested world of religious narrative and 
imagery is a valuable means of structuring one’s life around a conception of the good and of 
bringing about a corresponding transformation of one’s character’ (2005, 188).13 For religion to 
effectively guide our moral and practical actions, Eshleman proposes that the fictionalist 
‘inhabit’ the religious narrative and worldview. On these accounts, which are to some extent 
influenced by Kendall Walton’s (1990) writings on the role of immersion and make-believe in 
fiction, one not only continues to use religious claims in discourse, but fully immerses oneself in 
religious practice as a means to attain certain benefits, including self-understanding and moral 
and practical guidance.14 
 A deeper enjoyment of certain aesthetic experiences has also been proposed as an 
advantage of religious fictionalism. Andrea Sauchelli argues that ‘many religious works of art 
could not be (fully) appreciated if they were not properly understood from within a specific 
religious perspective’ (forthcoming). Works of art with a religious subject matter are widespread 
across times and cultures and often represent some of the world’s finest artworks. Sauchelli 
maintains that taking on a ‘fictionalist stance towards certain aspects of the religious beliefs in 
question would result in an increased level of understanding of the works in question and thus, 
probably, a more rewarding artistic and aesthetic experience’. However, some caution is needed 
here. Revolutionary fictionalism with respect to some given field of discourse is set up against 
the convention of speakers making assertions and believing what they say. Fictionalists then 
defend the legitimacy of sustained engagement with the discourse by quasi-asserting without 
belief. Imaginative indulgence in a distant culture for the purposes of aesthetic appreciation is 
not, therefore, fictionalism; nor does play acting or participating in a battle re-enactment require 
one to be a fictionalist, although some of the imaginative processes in these activities may be 
exploited by the fictionalist to explain her position. 
Here are two outstanding issues for revolutionary religious fictionalism. First, can a 
discourse the claims of which one does not actually believe provide a satisfactory basis for 
guiding and motivating one’s judgements (and thereby yield the practical benefits that 
fictionalists claim)? To some extent, the theory of immersion in a fiction is intended to address 
this concern: one may emotionally engage in a narrative that one does not believe. However, this 
                                                 
13 Eshleman’s work has been discussed in more depth in a recent critique from Cordry (2010) and 
response from Eshleman (2010). 
14 A similar account can be found in the work of Don Cupitt (1980). See Le Poidevin (1996, 112-114) for 
discussion of Cupitt’s theory. 
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leaves the problem of cases where the fiction comes into conflict with what one believes. 
Natalja Deng has argued that if, for example, fictionalists ‘non-doxastically accept that God 
forbids them to re-marry (p), they’ll take p into serious consideration when deciding whether to 
re-marry. But…they cannot base their decision on p. Instead they have to base it on their 
independent moral belief about whether marrying again is permissible’ (2015, 201). It seems 
that the fictionalist in this case must either break off engagement with the discourse by 
consulting what they believe, or else risk doing something that they believe to be immoral. One 
option suggested by Lipton’s treatment of fictionalism, is to avoid this kind of difficulty by 
restricting engagement with religion to claims that are not flatly inconsistent with one’s beliefs. 
However, this strategy will only be effective if the fictionalist does not have many independent 
beliefs about the topics on which religion pronounces; otherwise, the practical implementation 
of religious fictionalism will be significantly hampered.15 Deng’s proposal (2015, 202-03) is that 
we view the sorts of attitudes involved in fictionalism and our engagement with a discourse not 
in terms of non-doxastic acceptance, by which we use p as a basis for our practical-reasoning, 
but in terms of pretence and make-believe. She suggests that with make-believe one immerses 
oneself in a fiction largely for the experiential and psychological benefits enjoyed by doing so, 
rather than as a basis for decision making. Conflicts between the individual’s ethical views and 
the claims of the religious discourse will be less problematic on this approach, which appears 
most in line with the theory proposed by Le Poidevin.16 
A second problem concerns the norms of the discourse that a fictionalist should obey. If 
the sentences of religious discourse are not considered true then according to what norm are they 
accepted or rejected by the fictionalist using the discourse? Where this issue is addressed by 
religious fictionalists the remarks tend to be brief and programmatic, making it difficult to see 
how this works in practice. This is particularly an issue when experiences or events require the 
speaker to go ‘off-piste’ and say something that is not a routine or established part of the 
fictional narrative. If one can, in these cases, pursue pragmatically guided invention then what 
preserves the integrity of the discourse? Why not, for instance, mix in a bit of Buddhism, or 
some choice lessons from the writings of Dostoevsky, if these are deemed to have potentially 
beneficial effects? The appropriate norms for engaging in fictional religious discourse, therefore, 
is a currently undeveloped area of the theory. 
 
4. CONSERVATIONISM 
A related theory to revolutionary fictionalism, which has been defended recently by Jonas Olson 
(2014, Ch. 9) for ethical discourse, is conservationism. The conservationist agrees with the 
fictionalist that use of the discourse should be preserved even if the claims that the discourse 
makes are thought to be in error (so conservationism also rejects eliminativism). The two 
theories diverge on whether one may continue to believe and assert these claims: fictionalists 
propose that we quasi-assert the claims of the discourse, whereas conservationists propose that 
we continue to believe and assert them. In critical contexts – the philosophy classroom, for 
instance – one should recognise that the sentences of the discourse are untrue but when one 
                                                 
15 A related strategy would be to limit the practical effects of the fictionalist engagement to actions that 
do not conflict with one’s independently held moral beliefs. This is, of course, also restrictive depending 
on the moral beliefs in question. 
16 See Eshleman (2016, 167-68) for further discussion. 
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employs the discourse in uncritical contexts one should put aside sceptical concerns and believe. 
An advantage of this approach over fictionalism, in the case of moral discourse, is that there 
would be ‘no need for self-surveillance to prevent slips from pretence moral belief and pretence 
moral assertion into genuine moral belief and genuine moral assertion’ (Olson 2014, 190). 
Conservationism therefore recommends that one continue to engage with (the untrue claims of) 
the discourse in question, but dispenses with the complications of theories of pretence, 
immersion, hidden operators or quasi-assertion. This theory is particularly attractive when faced 
with certain psychological objections to fictionalism. Suppose that in a critical context (having 
read J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, for instance) you might believe that 
there is no such thing as moral wrongness, but in practical settings you find yourself believing 
that a certain harmful act or injustice is morally wrong. Conservationism proposes that this 
double-mindedness is defensible, and that you may assert that the act is wrong; fictionalism 
recommends that you should not believe the action to be morally wrong, and should only quasi-
assert that it is wrong.  
 Olson identifies a variety of religious conservationism in treatments of Pascal’s Wager 
(1962). The Wager recommends engaging with religion for prudential reasons, i.e. the benefits 
of an eternal life of happiness, despite lacking sufficient epistemic reasons for religious belief. 
The purpose of the engagement, for Pascal, is ‘belief in God, not mere pretence belief’ (Olson 
2014, 192). However, Pascal seems to envisage that religious belief emerges in those that live a 
religious life: one starts the endeavour as a sceptic pursuing religious activities for pragmatic 
reasons but one comes over time to have religious beliefs. If so, then one would not even in a 
critical context return to the sceptical approach. Conservationism, in contrast, requires a dual 
approach: scepticism in critical contexts and belief everywhere else. Conservationism remains 
an interesting and still largely unexplored theoretical option, however, even if Pascal is not an 
ideal example. 
 
5. FICTIONALISTS IN THE CLOSET 
With religious fictionalism clearly in view, we can see that many current and long-standing 
views about religious language and practice may be interpreted as fictionalist (or closely related 
thereof) while not explicitly presented as such. A possible early example is apophaticism, a 
position that was prominent from mid-antiquity to the late medieval period, with notable 
champions including Dionysius, Maimonides and the author of The Cloud of Unknowing. A 
central idea of apophaticism is that we are unable to mentally or linguistically represent God’s 
nature. As such, what we say in our attempts to describe God’s nature is untrue. However, 
apophatic authors show no sign of preferring the elimination of religious discourse or 
withdrawal from religious practice. In part, this seems to be because even though what we say 
about God is untrue and should not be believed, the activity of attempting to represent God, and 
the recognition of its failure, may promote a closer relationship with God. The benefits of 
continued engagement outweigh the drawback that talk of God does not yield truths. For a much 
more detailed discussion of this, see Scott and Citron (2016). (Note that insofar as this is 
religious fictionalism it is restricted to our engagement with God-talk). 
 A recent theory that may be fictionalist is the non-doxastic theory of faith (NDF). The 
central idea of this popular account of faith is that although some cognitive attitude is required 
8 
 
for propositional faith, this attitude need not be doxastic.17 Rather, it is sufficient for faith that 
one accept, assume, suppose, hope or acquiesce to claims from the religious domain. Some 
theories of non-doxastic faith go further. In his initial formulation of propositional faith, J. L. 
Schellenberg argued that ‘faith [that p] is positively incompatible with belief [that p]’ (2005, 
132). If this is correct then any proposition one has faith toward, when expressed in discourse, 
will not be believed. For instance, if I have faith that God is merciful, when I say ‘God is 
merciful’, I do not express belief in this proposition. Since this account was initially published, 
however, Schellenberg appears to have weakened his stance.18 He now maintains that NDF is ‘a 
way of having such faith’ (2013, 262). However, many supporters of NDF take the expression 
of faith without belief to be widespread. William Alston, for one, admits that he is ‘inclined to 
think that a sizable proportion of contemporary, sincere, devout Christians are accepters rather 
than believers’ (2007, 136). Now, to the extent that religious discourse trades in the 
communication of faithful attitudes, it follows from NDF, since many (if not all) of the faithful 
do not believe the religious propositions they affirm, that the most charitable interpretation of 
religious discourse is that it does not conventionally express the beliefs of speakers.19 When 
speakers express their faith they are, in effect, quasi-asserting religious sentences.  This appears 
to lend support to a (hermeneutic) variety of religious fictionalism.20  
 The claim that NDF is a kind of fictionalism has been used as an argument against the 
theory itself. Malcolm and Scott (forthcoming) use it, along with a variety of objections to NDF, 
to defend the position that belief is a necessary condition for propositional faith. One possible 
way to distinguish fictionalism from the faith as described by the supporter of NDF is in terms 
of the importance placed on truth (Malcolm, forthcoming). For the fictionalist, the truth of the 
claims of the discourse do not alter whether she should engage in it. In contrast, some authors 
defending NDF have claimed that ‘[w]e do not attribute faith to a person unless the truth or 
falsity of the proposition involved makes a difference to that person’ (Buchak 2012, 226). So, 
the two positions are distinct since the truth-value of the proposition(s) in question do not matter 
to the fictionalist, but they do matter to the person with faith. Although this response seems 
plausible, some examples suggest that the response is not so straightforward since there appear 
to be cases of faith without regard for the truth. For instance, when a person believes God exists 
and this person genuinely loves God but is suffering from a period of depression or akrasia, this 
person might, temporarily, not care whether God exists. Nevertheless, in virtue of her belief in 
and love for God it appears that this person should still be attributed with faith. More needs to 
be said concerning the role of truth in distinguishing NDF from fictionalism. Without a clear 
                                                 
17 NDF is endorsed by many philosophers, including Alston (1996), Audi (2011), Bishop (2007), Buchak 
(2012), Howard-Snyder (2013a; 2016), Kvanvig (2013), McKaughan (2013), Schellenberg (2005), and 
(sometimes) Swinburne (2005). Given that this list is not even exhaustive, NDF may be the most popular 
theory of faith in the current literature. 
18 He did so following objections made by Howard-Snyder (2013b). 
19 It is possible that NDF is true and that affirming one’s religious faith does conventionally express 
belief in what one says but this would have the upshot that the communication of faith is (often) 
insincere: one would be linguistically expressing commitment to belief in a proposition that one need 
only accept. 
20 An important feature of NDF is that faith is incompatible with disbelief, and if this condition is 
defensible, then a person who has non-doxastic faith can only meet the definition of agnostic 
fictionalism. 
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and defensible distinction between the two positions, NDF may still be taken to qualify as 
fictionalist. 
 Another theory which has components of hermeneutic religious fictionalism is John 
Hick’s pluralistic theory (1989). According to Hick, the world religions are largely in error with 
the claims they make about the supernatural, and yet Hick does not deny that there is some kind 
of supernatural realm. He typically refers to this as ‘the Real’, but advocates engaging with the 
Real through established religions that have proven themselves to be efficacious, and hence are 
genuinely directed towards this transcendental Real. To count as efficacious for Hick, a religious 
tradition must successfully lead to the ‘transformation of human existence from self-centredness 
to Reality-centredness’ (36). One can achieve this transformation by simply engaging with the 
genuine religious tradition as one engages with it traditionally, accepting and using religious 
discourse in such contexts as prayer and worship.21 
 
6. MORE ON HERMENEUTIC RELIGIOUS FICTIONALISM 
Unlike the change of attitude recommended by revolutionary fictionalism, hermeneutic 
fictionalism purports to describe current linguistic practice. On the face of it, hermeneutic 
fictionalism in religion looks more of a reach than it does for some other fields of discourse. For 
example, it seems that mathematics or ethical discourses are often engaged in (except when in 
philosophy seminars) without the speakers giving any consideration to the nature or existence of 
ethical properties or mathematical objects. So when a speaker says 
(5) There are two prime numbers between 3 and 9 
the hermeneutic fictionalist’s contention that she is not thereby committed to what the utterance 
entails – i.e. the existence of two abstract objects – has some purchase. Notably, if we imagine 
that it was discovered that there are no abstract objects, it seems that this would have no impact 
on mathematical discourse: we would unhesitantly continue to use sentences that, on face value, 
appear to describe or posit such objects.22 In contrast, reasons for not believing in the existence 
of God – the problem of evil, for instance – seem to be reasons for changing one’s religious 
attitudes or ceasing engagement with religious discourse at all. If hermeneutic fictionalism were 
true for religion, speakers would not start from a position of believing the claims of the 
discourse, so no change of attitude should be required. Notwithstanding the heavier lift required 
to defend hermeneutic varieties of religious fictionalism, we have seen that NDF is a candidate 
supporter of this theory. Here are two others.23 
 Georges Rey defends meta-atheism according to which practitioners of religion are self-
deceived about what they say (2006, 337). For anyone with a basic scientific education, Rey 
contends, it is obvious that religious claims are false. Rey does not propose, however, that 
                                                 
21 In an alternative response to religious diversity, Victoria Harrison (2010) has considered the prospects 
of fictionalism for reorienting the theoretical approach of philosophy of religion as a discipline. 
22 For more on this see discussion of the oracle argument: Burgess and Rosen (1997), Yablo (2000). 
23 There are other possibilities. Wittgenstein sometimes looks askance at the apparently extravagant 
supernatural commitments of some religious thinking: ‘For a blunder, that’s too big’ (1966, 62). One 
way of interpreting this (though certainly not the only one) is that religious utterances are – if taken as 
literal assertion – mistakes, but that speakers are not using religious sentences assertorically to express 
beliefs in their contents. This would be a kind of hermeneutic fictionalism. See also Howard Wettstein 
(2012, Ch. 13) who defends an account of religious engagement without metaphysical commitments. 
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educated speakers are thereby insincere when they affirm religious claims because they may 
think of themselves as believing what they are saying (2006, 338). Instead, speakers are in a 
state of self-deception. Whilst on a critical level they should recognise that the religious claims 
they utter are false, they have various reasons to put aside these consideration when using 
religious discourse. We have already encountered some of these reasons in the foregoing, such 
as having a sense of purpose or moral grounding, but other motivations might include showing 
loyalty to family and other social groups, personal ties and identifications with religious 
institutions, resistance to changing one’s public stance, the wish for one’s life to be part of a 
larger project. Now, Rey’s position is, to say the least, contentious (see Scott 2013 for a detailed 
critique); however, if self-deception is a state of mind that falls short of belief, we can 
understand meta-atheism as a kind of hermeneutic religious fictionalism. In uttering religious 
sentences speakers engage in quasi-assertion whereby they accept what is said without 
genuinely believing it to be true.  
 Some theories that take the utterances of religious discourse to be metaphorical may also 
fall under the umbrella of hermeneutic fictionalism.24 We typically do not believe the face-value 
content of the metaphorical utterance. For instance, we do not take someone saying 
(6) God is my rock. 
to believe that God is a rock. According to one way of understanding metaphorical utterances, 
what is said by the utterance is not believed by the speaker but used to suggest or imply some 
secondary proposition. However, if the metaphor theory of religious discourse is correct, then 
this secondary proposition – if it is religious – will also be a metaphor (and similarly for a 
tertiary proposition implied by the secondary one, and so on). This account yields a variety of 
hermeneutic fictionalism because religious discourse would not involve speakers believing any 
religious propositions. 
  
7. CONCLUSION 
Religious fictionalism has received support in recent years, and has seen a number of interesting 
developments that have taken the field further. The ethical benefits, transformative effects and 
imaginative enjoyment that comes from engaging with religion have all been used to support 
participation in religious practice without belief. Moreover, both recent and historical theories in 
religion appear interpretable according to fictionalist criteria. However, there are many options 
available to take the field further. Several proposals have been made for different varieties of 
fictionalism and related views like conservationism, whose benefits are yet to be evaluated in 
any kind of depth. There are outstanding objections to fictionalism that remain unresolved. 
Moreover, there is still much scope for developing on religious fictionalism from cognate areas 
such as ethics, and for viewing the various theories developed within theology and the 
philosophy of religion from a fictionalist perspective. 
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